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This paper represents the first major effort to conduct a comprehensive review 
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Academic Performance 
Program (APP) and to recommend to the NCAA Board of Directors those modi-
fications that will lead to further improvement in graduation performance. They 
fall into four categories: (a) new initial eligibility standards; (b) new requirements 
for 2-year college transfers; (c) new requirements for eligibility for postseason 
competition; and (d) new penalty structure and penalty thresholds. Conclusions 
and recommendations are offered.
Please indulge me if I open with a few personal observations from the perspective of 
someone who has served on the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) 
Board of Directors and who has been the only chair of the NCAA Committee on 
Academic Performance (CAP). As a member of the Board, I saw the graduation data 
that caused that group to seek a systematic approach that would produce better out-
comes. I was a part of those discussions that sought improvement without denying 
access to college- and university-level education for individuals, especially ethnic 
minorities, who were capable of working at that level while also participating in 
intercollegiate athletics. Then in my role with CAP, I observed and coordinated the 
work to design, implement, and refine a system that would work across the diverse 
membership of the NCAA’s Division I. A number of principles have undergirded 
this work from the beginning. CAP achieves a number of objectives: (a) ensures 
that student-athletes have real academic opportunities; (b) mandates that colleges 
are living up to their academic obligations to student-athletes; (c) makes decisions 
with the goal of improving academic success—not punishing students and schools; 
(d) bases all decisions on the best data available, and if CAP does not have data, 
it attempts to acquire data that would support better policies; and (e) continues to 
monitor its data to track intended and unintended consequences of its decisions, 
as this remains a work in progress.
I feel confident in saying that the members of CAP have embraced these prin-
ciples over the years. The system is the best that we have been able to achieve to this 
point, but we remain committed to addressing any opportunities for improvement. 
Harrison is President, University of Hartford, Hartford, CT, and Chair, Committee on Academic Per-
formance, NCAA.
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In many respects, this Keynote within the 2012 NCAA Scholarly Colloquium is 
a report on the first major effort to conduct a comprehensive review of the NCAA 
Academic Performance Program (APP) and to recommend to the NCAA Board 
of Directors those modifications that will lead to further improvement in gradua-
tion performance, while continuing to adhere to the principles stated previously.
The most recent efforts for academic reform within the NCAA were initiated in 
a mandate from the organization’s Board of Directors and have been designed and 
implemented through a committee, CAP, with important support from the NCAA 
staff. Following the Board mandate, initial design of the APP took place. This 
was followed by implementation, including initial data reporting and experience. 
Finally, we have had a chance to review the results and make modifications for the 
future. I will review each of these stages in this paper. This first cycle of the new 
academic reform effort has produced some significant progress, as well as some 
lessons and insights, all of which formed the basis for a review of the APP and led 
to recommendations recently adopted by the NCAA Board of Directors.
Mandate for Academic Reform  
and Foundations for a System
As an example of one part of the history of academic reform, in a meeting of the 
NCAA Board of Directors in April 2000, the Board considered establishing an 
incentive-based financial aid model in which overall financial aid limits in the sport 
of Division I men’s basketball would be based on each institution’s average 4-year 
graduation rate. At the time, the graduation rate in question would have been what 
is called the Federal Graduation Rate (FGR). This rate will be discussed later in 
this paper, along with issues that make using this rate as the basis for what would 
essentially be a penalty system that would have reduced the number of permissible 
grants-in-aid for squads with low graduation rates.
Subsequently, a more comprehensive approach to academic reform was adopted 
that was driven by a mandate from the NCAA Board that can be paraphrased as 
follows: create a system that will produce improved graduation performance, par-
ticularly in specific high-profile sports, without having disparate impact on ethnic 
minorities. The sports of primary concern initially were football and men’s bas-
ketball. The concern for disparate impact on ethnic minorities mirrored a running 
conversation within the NCAA regarding the consequences for ethnic minorities 
of relying on test scores to determine qualifications for athletic grants-in-aid.
Two special purpose committees formed within the NCAA conducted the 
analysis and proposals that became the foundation for the APP. One was a group 
called Academic Consultants, and the second was called the Incentives and Dis-
incentives Workgroup. The system that emerged from this work has three major 
parts, each of which required the creation of new elements within the NCAA 
system of governance for intercollegiate athletics. In somewhat oversimplified 
fashion, Table 1 outlines the system and the groups that contributed to its design 
and eventual operation. The group called Academic Consultants emerged from an 
action by the NCAA Board in April 1999 that approved a recommendation from 
the NCAA Management Council to form such a group. Work to form the Incentives 
and Disincentives Workgroup followed from work of the Division I Administrative 
Committee on September 5, 2002, that was in response to a Board directive to the 
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Management Council. CAP was designated to administer the APP in legislation 
adopted by the NCAA Board in April 2004.
As is evident from the overview, the work on academic reform proceeded in 
overlapping segments. Each of these groups that contributed to the design of this 
system was comprised of representatives from the member schools of the NCAA 
and included a combination of faculty, university chief executive officers, campus 
athletic administrators, and conference officials, all supported by the NCAA staff.
Initial Eligibility and Progress Toward Degree
As Petr and McArdle (2012) and Paskus (2012) have outlined, Initial Eligibility 
is an NCAA term that defines the conditions that must be met for a prospective 
student-athlete coming out of high school to qualify for athletically related financial 
aid at the college level. Those who meet this standard are referred to as qualifiers. It 
is important to note that this is not a statement about admissibility to any member 
institution of the NCAA; that is an admission decision that is the province of the 
institution. Based on extensive data analysis, which Petr and McArdle (2012) and 
Paskus (2012) discuss at length, initial eligibility was defined by a sliding scale 
that expresses a tradeoff between test score (e.g., SAT) and core grade point aver-
age (CGPA) for a defined number of high school core courses. The sliding scale 
was placed at approximately one standard deviation below the national mean for 
all students. The graph below expresses this tradeoff, indicating that a low test 
score can be offset by a high CGPA, and likewise, a low CGPA can be offset by 
a high test score. A prospective student-athlete must have a CGPA of at least 2.0 
and be above the sliding scale to qualify for athletically related financial aid at an 
NCAA member institution. The reasoning behind establishing this sliding scale 
was rooted in the portion of the NCAA Board’s mandate to avoid disparate impact 
on ethnic minorities. Note that the relevant endpoints of the sliding scale are test 
score/CGPA combinations of (400/3.55) and (1010/2.00), as illustrated by the 
dotted lines in Figure 1.
We should note here that an entering student-athlete who met these criteria 
was eligible to practice, to receive financial aid, and to compete. In the section 
entitled “New Directions for the NCAA Academic Performance Program,” we 
will review the new version of initial eligibility criteria that sets a higher standard 
for eligibility to compete.
The new Progress Toward Degree (PTD) standards were created to replace the 
former Continuing Eligibility requirements and were chosen to increase the likeli-
hood that a student-athlete who met the new requirements would graduate within 
Table 1 Elements and Groups of Governance
Group Elements
Academic consultants New standards: initial eligibility, progress toward degree
Incentives and Disincen-
tives Workgroup
New metrics: Academic Progress Rate (APR), Graduation 
Success Rate (GSR)
Committee on Academic 
Performance
New consequences: penalties for unacceptable performance, 
recognition for outstanding performance
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5 years. Examination of data revealed that the former requirements were allowing 
at least some student-athletes to maintain their athletic eligibility without resulting 
in steady progress toward graduation. A summary of the main elements of the new 
PTD requirements appears in Table 2. NCAA regulations permit a student-athlete 
to compete for 4 years within a 5-year window that starts with initial enrollment. 
If one assumes 120 semester hours as the requirement for graduation, the PTD 
conditions require a student-athlete to progress steadily toward graduation, com-
pleting essentially 20% of the total requirements for graduation in each of 5 years.
Figure 1 — Initial Eligibility Standards—Current and New for Fall 2015
Table 2 Progress Toward Degree Standards
Year of 
Enrollment Requirement to Enter the Following Year
First Year Completion of 24 semester hours of credit, and a GPA that is at or 
above 90% of that required for graduation
Second Year Completion of 40% of the requirements for graduation, and a GPA 
that is at or above 95% of that required for graduation
Third Year Completion of 60% of the requirements for graduation, and a GPA 
that is at or above 100% of that required for graduation
Fourth Year Completion of 80% of the requirements for graduation, and a GPA 
that is at or above 100% of that required for graduation
NCAA Academic Performance Program  69
New Metrics for Academic Performance
The mandate from the NCAA Board grew out of a desire to improve graduation 
performance for student-athletes, particularly in high-profile sports. However, the 
way in which graduation had typically been measured presented two challenges 
for creating a system that would improve graduation performance.
Historically, graduation has been measured by what is called the Federal 
Graduation Rate (FGR) mandated by the U.S. Department of Education. A student, 
whether athlete or not, who enters for the first time as a full-time enrollee at an 
institution is recorded as a graduate or nongraduate for this metric at the conclu-
sion of a 6-year period following initial full-time enrollment. The FGR, as reported 
publicly, is a 4-year average of the number of graduates from the institution of initial 
enrollment, divided by the number of initial full-time enrollments at the institution. 
Notice two important facts about this definition: (a) a student who transfers from 
the institution of initial enrollment, whether eligible to continue or not, is treated 
as a “graduation failure” for that institution; and (b) any student who transfers to 
an institution is not added to her or his cohort of initial enrollees at that institution 
and is therefore not accounted for in this metric.
In addition to the issue of transfers, any system that assigned penalties to an 
institution, program, or squad based on performance in the FGR (or any gradua-
tion metric) would be applying penalties to currently enrolled student-athletes for 
the lack of performance by student-athletes who had left the institution, whether 
as graduates or not. To create a system of performance measurement and conse-
quences for the NCAA, metrics would be needed that addressed these issues. The 
Incentives and Disincentives Workgroup was the body that reviewed the statistical 
analyses and recommended the new metrics that became the measurement system 
at the core of what would become the NCAA APP.
The new metrics created were the Academic Progress Rate (APR) and the 
Graduation Success Rate (GSR). Since other authors in this issue have described 
these metrics, I provide only a brief summary here.
The APR was created to provide a “real-time” measurement of the academic 
performance of student-athletes on a given team. To create this metric, an exten-
sive analysis of academic performance data for student-athletes was conducted to 
identify variables that would predict eventual graduation. This work revealed that 
retention and eligibility were strongly correlated with graduation. These variables 
became the basis for the APR, which is a 4-year moving average, computed for 
scholarship student-athletes on each squad that expresses the number of retention 
and eligibility points earned in a given year divided by the number of retention 
and eligibility points that were possible in the same given year. This ratio is then 
multiplied by 1,000 for ease of reporting and interpretation. In operation, each year 
of new data are incorporated into the 4-year moving average, and the oldest year 
of data are dropped from the calculation.
Because transfers are a reality in higher education and particularly for student-
athletes, the Incentives and Disincentives Workgroup sought a graduation metric 
that would address this issue. The result was the GSR, a relatively straightforward 
modification of the FGR that can be described as follows. A student-athlete who 
leaves the institution of initial enrollment, but who was eligible to continue had 
he/she stayed at that institution, is removed from her or his cohort of initial 
enrollment. And, a student-athlete who transfers into an institution is added to 
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the appropriate cohort of initial enrollment for purposes of measuring graduation 
performance.
The logic of these modifications is that a student who leaves an institution, but 
is eligible to continue, has met her or his academic responsibilities at that institu-
tion and should not be classified as a graduation failure there, but rather simply 
a nonevent, at least insofar as graduation is considered. However, a departing 
student-athlete who was not eligible to continue is still considered the responsibil-
ity of that institution and is treated as a nongraduate. Similarly, a student-athlete 
who transfers to an institution becomes the responsibility of that institution and 
is considered in determining the overall graduation performance of the squad that 
she or he joins. Using this new measurement of graduation includes almost 30,000 
additional student-athletes (data for 2001–2004) being included in measurement of 
graduation performance in comparison with the FGR. In many cases, the GSR is 
higher than the FGR, but in a number of instances, particularly for squads that have 
a large number of transfer students, the GSR is lower than the FGR. Note that the 
GSR utilizes a 6-year time period for measurement, just as is the case for the FGR.
The combination of APR and GSR formed the measurement basis for the APP. 
Among the important early decisions in this design was the conclusion that the 
unit of measurement should be the squad and that all student-athletes receiving any 
amount of athletically related financial aid should be included in the measurement. 
With the completion of each year, new data are reported to the NCAA by member 
institutions, compiled by the NCAA staff, and reported, among other ways, through 
posting on the NCAA public web site. Interested individuals can learn the most 
recent APR and GSR results for any squad at any member institution at http://ncaa.
org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Academics/Division+I/.
New Consequences (Penalties and Recognition)
While the Incentives and Disincentives Workgroup did some preliminary work on 
a system of penalties for the APP, the CAP finalized the system, with approval by 
the Board of Directors. Initially, CAP proposed four years of APR data be gathered 
before any penalties were imposed and the committee proposed a four-level system 
of progressive penalties.
Setting of the threshold for team penalties was new territory for the NCAA, 
and one of the most important philosophical changes in the entire academic reform 
effort. First, penalties that might be applied to a squad needed to be based on a 
measure of performance the squad itself had produced (rather than some predeces-
sor group). To accomplish this, the APR became the basis for assigning penalties 
because of its contemporary nature. The level of APR below which penalties would 
be assessed was then a complex discussion of the correlation between APR and 
graduation, the anticipated impact across member institutions of varying missions 
and resources, and the anticipated differential impact on squads in different sports. 
The CAP recommended 900 as the penalty threshold, noting that this level of APR 
corresponded to a FGR level of approximately 50%. At the time, the GSR had not 
been implemented, so data on this metric were not yet available for consideration. 
The CAP also considered the effect of squad size: a football squad could have 85 
student-athletes on financial aid, whereas a golf or tennis squad might have fewer 
than 10% of that number on aid. This difference was one reason for the recom-
mendation that the APR be a 4-year rolling average, but even with that, CAP 
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recommended use of what was called a squad-size adjustment that essentially gave 
small squads the benefit of the doubt in the early years.
Data analysis during the design stage of this system also revealed that low-
resource and Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) would likely be 
more heavily impacted than would other institutions. The response was implementa-
tion of a set of mission filters that would provide relief from penalties, particularly 
in the early years of operation of the APP. The filters were based on factors such as 
resource level of the institution, academic characteristics of the institution, compari-
son within a specific sport group, and demonstrated APR improvement over time.
The initial penalty structure recommended to the Board had four levels. Level 
One consisted of a warning letter, while Level Two entailed loss of playing or 
practice time. At Level Three, the team incurred loss of eligibility for postseason 
competition, such as bowl games or national championships. Finally, Level Four 
entailed restricted membership in the NCAA. This system obviously begins with 
a mild penalty, but it is progressive in severity.
While the Board accepted this overall penalty structure, the Board wanted impact 
from this new system without having to wait for accumulation of 4 years of data. 
In response, CAP recommended and the Board adopted what became known as the 
contemporaneous penalty. This penalty was to take effect based on three years of 
APR data, and it provided that any scholarship vacated by a student-athlete who was 
not eligible to continue could not be rewarded for any squad with an APR below 925. 
The originally proposed penalty structure became known as the historical penalties, 
and squads with APRs below 900 would be subject to those progressively more 
severe penalties once four years of APR data had been compiled. As is suggested by 
the two penalty levels, the contemporaneous penalty (taking effect for APR values 
below 925) was intended to be a “warning shot” in the first phase of implementa-
tion of the penalty structure. The historical penalties (taking effect for APR values 
below 900) were intended for instances of more problematic academic performance.
It was hoped that an incentive program could be developed to reward programs 
that were performing at very high levels. However, recognition of high levels of 
performance proved to be a complex topic for CAP. Early discussions explored 
possibilities for direct financial rewards for squads that performed well in the APR. 
Since any allocation of NCAA funds for this purpose would have been a reallocation 
from some other intended or planned use, these ideas did not win support from the 
membership. In the final analysis, the Committee decided to recognize publicly 
each year those squads with APRs in the top 10% of results for that sport. On the 
other hand, while it is possible to compute a program APR, that is not done by the 
NCAA and is not encouraged. This emphasizes that the unit of measurement is the 
squad and that the consequences, whether penalties or recognition, are consistent 
with this concept.
This approach to academic reform was new territory for the NCAA. Previous 
efforts had been focused on initial eligibility and continuing eligibility requirements 
and measurement of graduation results via the FGR. This former approach provided 
neither in-process reporting of results nor mechanisms for identification of either 
poor or excellent performance, except to the extent that federal graduation data 
captured what happened to each cohort after it had completed its 6-year pipeline, 
again without adequately addressing transfers as noted above. This new system 
created measurement of progress for enrolled student-athletes and consequences 
that were intended to incentivize improvement where that was needed.
72  Harrison
Important guiding principles of the NCAA’s approach to academic reform 
include:
•	 Utilizing	data-based	decisions	for	design.	Each	of	the	elements	of	the	three-part	
system summarized above required careful consideration of issues that were 
inevitably complex because the NCAA membership and range of sports are 
complex. Accordingly, each step of the design work involved decisions that 
were based on the best data available to the NCAA.
•	 Learning	and	revising	as	appropriate	based	on	experience	during	implementa-
tion. The desire to get a system into operation at the earliest practicable point 
was sometimes at odds with the objective to devise a system that was compre-
hensive and fair to all parties. These competing objectives led to the conscious 
decision to implement a good system, realizing that we could learn from early 
experience and adapt or refine the system based on the data obtained during 
early operating experience.
•	 Systematically	evaluating	after	a	suitable	period	of	operating	experience	and	
revising as appropriate. Four years of data reporting would be required to 
compile the first 4-year averages of APR for all squads. Still more years would 
be required to gather the first experience with the initial penalty thresholds that 
had been set. With 2003–2004 being the first year of data reporting for the APR, 
the first entering cohort would complete its 6-year span for measurement of 
graduation results at the end of the 2008–2009 academic year. Finally, APR data 
through the 2008–2009 year would first be made public by the NCAA in the 
spring of 2010. These factors influenced scheduling of the first overall review 
of the APP. The review of the APP that occurred during the 2010–2011 year 
took advantage of the full range of data on results and the related experience 
with the APP to that point.
The next section contains a summary of implementation and experience during 
the first years of operation of the APP. The subsequent section presents results of 
the review of the APP and the new directions recommended by CAP and adopted 
by the NCAA Board in October 2011.
Implementation
A short chronology of the APP follows:
•	 2003–2004	was	the	first	year	for	which	APR	data	were	reported;
•	 2005–2006	was	the	year	following	which	the	first	3-year	average	APRs	were	
available for determination of contemporaneous penalties;
•	 2006–2007	was	the	year	following	which	the	first	4-year	average	APRs	were	
available for determination of historical penalties; hence, the first warning 
letters	(Level	1	penalty)	were	issued	based	on	data	through	2006–2007;
•	 2008–2009	was	the	year	that	completed	the	6-year	time	window	for	the	cohort	
that first enrolled in the fall of 2003 (the first year for which APR data were 
reported);
•	 2009–2010	is	the	most	recent	year	for	which	APR	data	were	reported	publicly;	
and
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•	 2010–2011	is	the	most	recently	completed	year.	APR	data	for	2010–2011	have	
been submitted to the NCAA and will be reported publicly in the spring of 2012.
During the initial years of operation of the APP, three important adjustments 
were made to the way in which the APR is calculated. Each of these is summarized 
below:
•	 Delayed	graduation	point:	With	the	APR	based	on	the	number	of	eligibility	
and retention points earned each semester (or quarter) by the scholarship 
student-athletes on a squad, an individual who leaves an institution without 
graduation results in the loss of at least a retention point, and possibly an 
eligibility point, as well. Recognizing that some of these individuals return to 
their institutions to complete their degrees, CAP instituted an adjustment to the 
APR that gave a squad credit for such a “delayed graduation.” In essence this 
was simply allowing a squad to recover a retention point that had previously 
been lost. Recovery of a lost eligibility point was not possible through this 
mechanism. This adjustment was viewed as supporting the overall objective 
of the APP—namely, graduation.
•	 Professional	 departure	 adjustment:	A	number	 of	 sports	 obviously	 provide	
opportunities for professional careers, and numerous cases exist of departures 
before graduation to pursue these opportunities. After examination of the data 
related to this factor, CAP instituted an adjustment to the APR that gave a squad 
relief for what would otherwise be a lost retention point if a student-athlete 
left for a bona fide professional opportunity and was eligible to continue at the 
time of departure. Note that this adjustment was only permitted if the depart-
ing individual had met her or his academic responsibilities through the time 
of enrollment before departure. This includes the fact that to be eligible to 
continue, a student-athlete must be meeting the applicable PTD requirements.
•	 Eligible	transfers:	The	original	definition	of	the	APR	caused	a	squad	to	lose	a	
retention point when a student-athlete transferred to another institution, even 
if at the time of the transfer the student-athlete was eligible to continue. This 
definition was adopted because of the high correlation between retention/eli-
gibility and graduation. However, as noted above, the GSR, adopted as a new 
and more comprehensive measure of graduation, removed eligible transfers 
from the calculation of this graduation metric. The data showed that eligible 
transfers who had a cumulative GPA of at least 2.6 at the time of transfer were 
substantially more likely to graduate than were those who transferred with 
GPAs below 2.6. Based on this significant break in graduation performance, 
CAP adopted an adjustment to the APR that provided relief to a squad that 
experienced a transfer, provided the individual was eligible to continue and 
had a cumulative GPA of at least 2.6 (along with some additional minor con-
ditions). This adjustment was adopted because it improved the consistency 
between the calculation of the APR and that of the GSR.
These adjustments, individually and in combination, had an effect on the dis-
tribution of APR data across the NCAA membership that can be summarized as 
follows: (a) the left tail of the distribution of APR scores moved up; (b) the mean 
and median values of the APR moved up; and (c) the variation in APR scores (typi-
cally summarized in the standard deviation) became smaller. Since the empirical 
changes indicated above mean shifts in the APR data, one could expect resulting 
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changes in the number of squads above the penalty thresholds. This factor would 
become one of the issues requiring study in the future review planned for the APP.
The adjustments in calculation of the APR described above were generated 
primarily in response to feedback from within the NCAA. In addition, the APP 
was of interest to people and organizations outside of the NCAA. For example, 
the Knight Commission recommended that the harsher penalties, including loss 
of eligibility for postseason competition, should be imposed earlier in the penalty 
structure. In addition, in a 2009 speech to the NCAA Convention, United States 
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan recommended that men’s basketball squads 
with graduation rates not be eligible for selection to the NCAA Tournament. While 
this penalty had been a part of the APP system from the beginning, it only occurred 
at Level Three of the original penalty structure. Secretary Duncan’s recommenda-
tion was to make it a stand-alone penalty and to base it on graduation performance, 
rather than the APR. These proposals will be discussed in the following section.
The first years of APR data revealed that three men’s sports were producing 
APR values noticeably lower than those of other sports. In response, the NCAA 
formed three successive groups—first the Baseball Academic Enhancement 
Group, then the (men’s) Basketball Academic Enhancement Group, and third the 
Football Academic Work Group—to study these results, explore the contributing 
causes, and recommend legislation that would lead to improved performance. The 
lesson from this process was that each sport has its own characteristics that help 
to explain the academic performance observed in the specific sport. The Baseball 
group proposed a package of legislation that was adopted and implemented, and 
subsequent APR values have improved. Results from the Basketball and Football 
groups were recommended somewhat later and are still working their way through 
the NCAA legislative process. For example, one concept that emerged from the 
Basketball group, what has been called the Academic Year-in-Residence, is part 
of the package that will be described in the subsequent section.
In August 2011, NCAA President Mark Emmert convened a Presidential 
Retreat that included institutional Chief Executive Officers (presidents or chancel-
lors) from each conference, as well as representatives from other relevant interest 
groups. That retreat identified academic integrity as one of the important themes 
for future work and noted that CAP was the appropriate working group to continue 
analysis and recommendations for action.
At this writing (spring 2012) the most recent publication of APR data by the 
NCAA occurred in the spring of 2011, meaning that data for the 2009–2010 year 
were the most recent data included in those reports. APR data for the 2010–2011 
year have been submitted to the NCAA during the fall of 2011 and are now going 
through the annual cycle of corrections, adjustments, and waivers. Among other 
things, this means that two entering cohorts, those for fall 2003 and fall 2004, have 
completed the 6-year time window that is used for measuring graduation perfor-
mance. This set the stage for CAP to conduct a comprehensive review of the APP, 
to consider all of the changes that had occurred, and to review all of the feedback 
and	experience	that	had	been	accumulated	during	the	7	years	of	data	reporting,	
penalty assignment, and public reporting. This work proceeded in collaboration 
and consultation with the Academic Cabinet—the two groups conducted a joint 
review of the requirements in initial eligibility. The proposals to the NCAA Board 
of Directors for modification that grew out of that review are summarized in the 
following section.
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New Directions for the NCAA Academic  
Performance Program
In its October 2011 meeting, the NCAA Board of Directors set a number of new 
directions for the NCAA APP that were a direct consequence of the data and analy-
sis conducted by the NCAA CAP, supported by the NCAA Research Staff. Petr 
and McArdle (2012) and Paskus (2012) reviewed the results generated since the 
2003–2004 first year of data reporting under this program. This included a summary 
of the modifications made in the calculation of the APR and the consequences in 
the aggregate data. As a result of analysis by CAP and parallel work by the NCAA 
Academic Cabinet, a set of new directions was recommended to the NCAA Board 
of Directors for consideration. This section will review those changes. They fall 
into four categories: (a) new initial eligibility standards; (b) new requirements for 
2-year college transfers; (c) new requirements for eligibility for postseason competi-
tion; and (d) new penalty structure and penalty thresholds. It is important to note 
here that all of these issues were under consideration by CAP and the Academic 
Cabinet before the presidential retreat. Therefore, ideas for improvements in each 
of these areas were already quite ripe. Actions at the presidential retreat served 
more to confirm the commitment of the membership and condense the timeline 
for review, rather than to alter the overall policy direction that was already under 
discussion within these groups.
New Initial Eligibility Standards
Background. As has been noted earlier in this Colloquium, one topic that seems 
to be perpetually under discussion at the NCAA is the academic eligibility of 
freshmen student-athletes. Over the past few years, we have continued to hear that 
underprepared student-athletes are allowed to compete at Division I institutions. 
At the same time, data clearly indicate that many student-athletes who are close to 
our current minimum standards are academically successful. These realities make 
for challenging decision making when it comes to setting standards for financial 
aid, practice, and competition for Division I freshman student-athletes. Layer on 
significant institutional and demographic differences among our membership and 
student-athletes, and this issue becomes very complex.
Despite all of these difficulties, CAP and the Academic Cabinet forged ahead 
with efforts to alter our initial eligibility standards. The rules that we proposed 
represent something of a departure in philosophy from previous efforts in this area. 
Rather than starting with the presumption of eligibility for all student-athletes and 
imposing a floor for freshmen to receive financial aid, we began with a presump-
tion of ineligibility for competition, with the ability for better-prepared students to 
become immediately eligible. While many more student-athletes may be impacted 
by the new standards, the penalty (losing the ability to compete) is not as harsh 
as in previous initial eligibility standards where access to higher education was at 
risk because rules were tied directly to receipt of athletics aid.
In the end, this constitutes a more nuanced approach to initial eligibility 
than we have taken in the past. Under the new standards, there remain students 
who have not prepared themselves sufficiently well in high school to provide 
them with the opportunity to receive a scholarship or compete at the collegiate 
level—these are the nonqualifiers. There are other students whom we believe 
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have demonstrated sufficient academic ability to show us that they can handle 
the academic rigors of collegiate life at the same time as competing on the field 
of play—these are full qualifiers. Now, however, we have added a third group 
who are coming to us with some amount of risk from an academic perspective. 
Student-athletes who fall into this third group will still be able to receive athleti-
cally related financial aid and to practice, but they will not be allowed to compete 
or to travel with their athletics team. Instead, the student-athletes will spend an 
academic redshirt year to concentrate on their education before they are allowed 
to begin athletics competition.
It is the hope of the committee that this approach will continue to allow access 
to student-athletes who have reasonable chances of succeeding, but will assist those 
who are borderline students to get themselves appropriately integrated academi-
cally before adding the rigors of athletics competition to their lives at the college 
or university level.
Eligibility for Practice and Athletically Related Financial Aid. Require Prospec-
tive Student-Athletes (PSAs) to meet the current qualifier standard for eligibility 
for practice during the first regular term and receipt of athletically related finan-
cial aid during the first year. Second-semester (and second- and third-quarter) 
eligibility for practice requires successful completion of nine semester or eight 
quarter hours in the first regular academic term of enrollment.
What Is New. The requirement to complete nine semester (or eight quarter) hours 
in the first academic term to be eligible for practice in terms subsequent to the term 
of initial enrollment is new.
Eligibility to Compete During the First Year of Collegiate Enrollment. Require 
PSAs to satisfy three criteria: (a) achieve a higher core GPA/test score combina-
tion, what is referred to as the sliding scale (details follow below); (b) obtain a 
minimum core GPA of 2.3 in the 16 core courses currently required; and (c) meet 
additional core-course requirements (details follow below). The NCAA Board of 
Directors has set the new sliding scale at approximately one half of a standard 
deviation below the national student-body mean. This represents a move upward of 
the sliding scale of test score/CGPA combination from approximately one standard 
deviation below the national student mean, which had been the previous sliding 
scale for the combination of eligibility for practice, athletically related financial 
aid, and competition. The second requirement above simply raises the required 
minimum core GPA from 2.0 to 2.3.
To be eligible to compete in the first year of college enrollment, PSAs 
must successfully complete 10 core courses prior to the seventh semester (or 
equivalent) of high school; successfully complete seven of these 10 core courses 
in English, math, and natural/physical science; and use these core courses (and 
grades) in calculating the core GPA for purposes of meeting the sliding scale and 
GPA minimum. This imposes new requirements on both the timing and content 
of core courses taken. These new initial eligibility standards will be in effect for 
students entering any collegiate institution full time on or after August 1, 2015. 
As was done when the minimum number of core courses was increased from 14 
to 16, this effective date provides nearly four full academic years for adjustment 
to the new standards.
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In Figure 1, the horizontal solid line is set at a CGPA of 2.3 and the diagonal 
solid line is the new sliding scale of “tradeoffs” between CGPA and SAT score. 
A prospective student-athlete must be above both lines to qualify to participate in 
competition during the first term of enrollment.
This is the first instance of setting additional requirements for eligibility 
for competition, beyond the requirements for eligibility to practice and receive 
financial aid, during the first year of enrollment. This creates the possibility 
of a student-athlete who is eligible to practice and receive athletically related 
financial aid, but who is not eligible to compete during the first year of enroll-
ment—what might be called an academic redshirt. The objective in this action 
is to continue to provide access to higher education for these individuals, but 
to remove the pressure and time requirements of competition and provide more 
time for academic work.
Based on current data, approximately 0.4% of current student-athletes would 
be ineligible for the combination of practice and aid. In addition, approximately 
15.5% of current student-athletes would be ineligible for competition only.
New Requirements for 2-Year College Transfer Students
One of the clear findings from our academic data over the past several years is that 
transfer student-athletes from 2-year colleges perform less well academically than 
other student-athletes. This finding is an occasion when student-athletes actually 
perform somewhat differently than nonathlete students (e.g., 2-year college trans-
fers) in the student body. We believe that this is because the reasons for student-
athletes to attend 2-year colleges are fundamentally different (i.e., more likely to 
be due to academic deficiencies) than other students who attend 2-year colleges.
While we had clear evidence of this consistent underperformance among 
2-year transfer student-athletes, we had no access to data regarding their academic 
backgrounds from the 2-year colleges until the NCAA began collecting information 
about the 2-year college academic preparation of these students, and those data then 
informed the recent policy changes that were adopted by the Association. Once we 
had collected the data, our analyses showed that the GPA at the 2-year college was 
the best predictor of academic success that we had available to us. We also saw 
that student-athletes who had completed work in a set of core-curriculum courses 
(e.g., English, math and science) were more likely to succeed at the 4-year institu-
tion. Finally, we observed that student-athletes who transferred with a significant 
number of physical education activity courses were less likely to be successful in 
our institutions than other 2-year college transfers. These findings contributed to 
the formulation the policy changes that are outlined below.
The NCAA Board of Directors adopted two legislative proposals (Numbers 
2011–69	and	2011–70)	that	set	additional	requirements	in	order	for	students	trans-
ferring from 2-year colleges to be eligible for competition. These requirements 
include: (a) increasing the minimum transferable GPA for eligibility for competition 
to 2.5 from the current 2.0; (b) permitting use of no more than two credit hours 
of physical education activity courses in all sports to meet requirements; and (c) 
requiring completion of three semesters or four quarters credit hours of transferable 
natural/physical science credit for nonqualifiers (individuals who did not meet the 
requirements of the sliding scale out of high school).
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The first requirement creates the possibility of a transfer student who is eligible 
to practice and receive financial aid, but not to compete—this would apply to an 
individual who has a transferable GPA of at least 2.0, but less than the 2.5 required 
for eligibility to compete. This parallels the academic redshirt status described 
above under initial eligibility.
These new transfer requirements will be effective for students initially enrolling 
full time in any college on or after August 1, 2012. A new waiver subcommittee 
of the NCAA Division I PTD Waivers Committee will be effective April 1, 2012, 
as a result of actions by the NCAA Board of Directors taken in connection with 
these new standards.
In addition to the actions summarized above, the NCAA Board of Directors 
allowed Proposal 2011–65 regarding establishing an academic year of readiness 
to continue in the normal legislative cycle. This could result in Board approval in 
either January or April of 2012.
New Requirements for Access to Postseason Competition
As Petr and McArdle (2012)and Paskus (2012) noted, over time there have been 
substantive changes made to the calculation of the APR score. While those changes 
emerged from recommendations from the membership and evaluation by the CAP, 
they did have an impact on what the APR score is and what it means. Because of 
that, for the past year CAP undertook a complete review of the APP program with 
a focus on understanding how the changes in APR may have impacted the number 
and type of teams being penalized. In that process, we learned that our estimated 
GSR for a given APR score had changed significantly from our original intent. 
Specifically, when we began this process, an APR of 900 was the score that best 
predicted a 50% GSR. After all of the changes to APR were put into place, the 
appropriate APR score to reflect a 50% GSR was found to be between 925 and 
930. This understanding led CAP to recommend (and the Board to adopt) a 930 
as the new penalty threshold.
The preceding section contains a reference to Secretary’s Duncan’s recom-
mendation regarding postseason eligibility. Other individuals and groups had raised 
a similar point. One specific recommendation was to base eligibility for postseason 
competition (bowls, tournaments, national championships) on graduation perfor-
mance (e.g., the level of the GSR). A quick examination of that possibility reveals 
that it would impose the penalty on a squad that had nothing to do with producing 
the value of the GSR that earned the penalty. This is because, by definition of the 
GSR, individuals whose graduation performance is measured in the GSR have 
completed their 6-year time window for graduation and are no longer eligible for 
intercollegiate competition. In consequence, CAP sought a contemporaneous metric 
that could serve the same purpose.
After examination and deliberation the CAP recommended that the APR also be 
used to determine eligibility for postseason competition and also recommended that 
the same 930 threshold be used for this purpose. The Committee recommended, and 
the NCAA Board of Directors established, a 930 APR as a minimum academic stan-
dard for participation in postseason competition. Moreover, this is to be an annual 
determination of academic accountability. Previously, the possibility of postseason 
ineligibility was embedded in the multilevel penalty structure of the APP—at the 
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third occasion. This action makes eligibility for postseason competition an annual 
and separate determination based on the most recently publicized 4-year average 
APR. Postseason competition includes all postseason events conducted after the 
last regular-season contest or end-of-conference tournament. Thus, it includes bowl 
games, the NCAA basketball tournament for men or women, the NIT, the WNIT, 
and so on. In sports in which individual competitors are identified for postseason 
competition, individuals on teams that fail to meet the team eligibility standard of 
930 will not be eligible for postseason competition. Examples include swimming 
and track and field.
In taking this action, the NCAA Board of Directors also approved two “filters” 
that provide relief from the postseason eligibility requirements (but not relief from 
Levels One, Two, or Three penalties that are discussed later in this paper). The two 
relief filters are referred to as the Mission Filter and the Improvement Filter and 
are described below. A squad that falls below the threshold required for postseason 
competition can gain relief via the Mission Filter on the first occasion a team is below 
the penalty threshold. To qualify for relief via the Mission Filter, the institution 
must be in the bottom 15% of the resource distribution, as defined by the current 
CAP policy and the team’s most recent 4-year GSR must be 50% or higher. This 
Table 3 APR Benchmarks
Postseason 
Competition 
Year
Multiyear APR to Avoid 
Ineligibility for Postseason
Two Most Recent Years 
Average APR to Avoid 
Ineligibility for Postseason 
(Improvement Filter)
2011–12 Status quo—current penalty struc-
ture and benchmarks apply
N/A
2012–13 Four APR of 900 or higher Two most recent years average 
APR at or above 930OR
2013–14 Four-Year Apr of 900 or higher Two most recent years average 
APR at or above 930OR
2014–15 Four-Year APR of 930 or higher Two most recent years average 
APR at or above 940OR
2015–16 and 
beyond
Four-Year APR of 930 N/A
*Improvement Filter applies the 
second time and beyond a team is 
subject to postseason ineligibility. 
This filter requires the two most 
recent years of APR must be at or 
above 950.
Note: The Mission Filter applies only the first time a team is subject to postseason ineligibility. In 
taking these actions regarding postseason competition, the NCAA Board of Directors also directed 
that each conference must adopt a written policy regarding teams subject to a postseason restriction. 
This written policy must address and clarify the conference’s automatic qualification for postseason/
championship competition and revenue distribution. Each conference is permitted to develop its own 
policy, but a written policy will now be required.
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filter provides relief only from the postseason penalty and not from the Level One, 
Two, and Three penalties described subsequently. On the other hand, a squad that 
falls below the threshold required for postseason competition can gain relief via 
the Improvement Filter by showing meaningful improvement in its most recent 
years. Specifically, a team must have an average APR of 950 over the two most 
recent years to meet this test. This filter only applies to the second and subsequent 
times that a team is subject to postseason ineligibility. Appeals and waivers will 
be processed through the penalty structure process. APR benchmarks during the 
transitional phase for access to postseason competition are summarized in Table 3.
New Penalty Structure: Three Levels
Based on recommendations from CAP, the NCAA Board of Directors adopted a 
new, three-level penalty structure that will replace the current combination of con-
temporaneous and historical penalties. A summary of these changes is as follows. 
The current warning of a Level One penalty has been eliminated, as has the so-called 
contemporaneous penalty of nonrenewal of a vacated scholarship if the individual 
was not eligible to continue. Reduction in playing and practice time during the 
competition season (in-season) becomes a Level One penalty (where previously 
this penalty had been at Level Two). New Level Two penalties apply to noncham-
pionship seasons, spring football, or the championship season for sports that have 
no nonchampionship season. Finally, the changes create a menu of possible Level 
Three penalties to be administered by the Committee on Academic Performance.
A team subject to a Level One penalty would experience a reduction by 4 
hours/one day of practice per week during the competition season (in-season). This 
results in a maximum of 16 hours/5 days of athletically related activity rather than 
the permissible 20 hours and 6 days in the absence of this penalty. The lost time 
must be replaced by academic activities.
A team subject to a Level Two penalty experiences the in-season reductions 
associated with a Level One penalty and also a reduction of 4 hours of practice 
per week out-of-season. In addition, if applicable, the nonchampionship season 
or spring football would be cancelled. Sports without nonchampionship seasons 
would experience a 10% reduction in contests and length of competition season. 
The NCAA Board of Directors is aware that other groups are considering the pos-
sibility of eliminating noncompetition seasons or reducing regular seasons. If these 
concepts progress to actions, CAP would revisit these penalty issues.
Teams that reach Level Three of the penalty structure would be subject to Level 
Three penalties repeatedly until the team APR improves. The menu of options avail-
able at this level includes financial aid penalties (any amount, any type); practice 
penalties (reduction of 4 hours/week and up); contest reductions (10% up to full 
season); restricted and corresponding membership in the NCAA; coach-specific 
penalties, including game restrictions and recruiting restrictions; restricted access 
to practice for incoming student-athletes who fall below predetermined academic 
standards; or multiyear postseason competition ban. Under current policy a team 
that enters the existing multilevel penalty structure must achieve three consecutive 
years of penalty-free performance to recover to good standing.
APR benchmarks during the transitional phase for Level One, Two, and Three 
penalties are summarized in the Table 4.
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Summary and Conclusion
Now, let me offer some observations as we complete the first comprehensive review 
and embark on a new phase of the NCAA APP. The APP has been in effect for 
8 years, seven of which (2003–2004 through 2009–2010) have been reported to 
the public on the established cycle for this process, and the most recent of which 
(2010–2011) will be reported in the spring of 2012. Progress in graduation perfor-
mance has been made, in general, and in baseball, football, and men’s basketball, 
in particular. However, men’s basketball remains the sport with the lowest overall 
APR. Calculation and reporting of the APR and the GSR will continue as in recent 
years. Such adjustments in the calculation of the APR have made it advisable to 
adjust the penalty cut-score upward to 930.
In addition, core-course requirements have been strengthened for prospective 
student-athletes, and initial eligibility requirements have been made more rigorous. 
The initial eligibility requirements for competition in the first year of enrollment 
have been strengthened, while the previous set of initial eligibility requirements 
will continue to provide access to higher education for student-athletes who will 
be eligible for athletically related financial aid and practice, but not competition 
during the first year of enrollment.
Now that several years of experience have been completed, it is also logical 
to consolidate the contemporaneous and historical penalties into a single, progres-
sive penalty system. In addition, and after careful review, eligibility for postseason 
competition will become a separate, annual determination based on the 4-year 
APR, rather than a part of the progressive penalty system. Penalties have been 
modified to place loss of playing/practice time at the first level, and the third level 
of penalties has been converted to a menu of options to be administered by CAP. 
Finally, a carefully considered timetable for implementation of these changes has 
Table 4 APR Benchmarks in Transitional Phase
Championship/
Postseason 
Competition Year
Multiyear APR to Avoid 
Ineligibility for Level One, 
Two, and Three Penalties Improvement Filters
2011–2012 Status Quo Status Quo
2012–2013 4-Year APR of 900 or higher Level One: None
OR Improvement Levels Two and Three: Two 
most recent years APR average 
of 950 or higher
2013–2014 4r-Year APR of 900 or higher Level One: None
OR Improvement Levels Two and Three: Two 
most recent years APR average 
of 950 or higher
2014–2015 and 
beyond
4-Year APR of 930 or higher Level One: None
OR Improvement Levels Two and Three: Two 
most recent years APR average 
of 950 or higher
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been defined that will provide time for adaptation at both the high school and col-
lege/university levels.
Division I of the NCAA has a complex and diverse membership. The NCAA 
Academic Performance Program has led to improvement in graduation performance, 
particularly in the sports that led to its creation, while also attempting to recognize 
and accommodate mission and resource differences that exist across Division I. 
The APP is entering a new phase, but it remains grounded in the principles that 
were summarized earlier in this paper. The Committee on Academic Performance 
will continue with data-based review and refinement of the APP.
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